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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the implications of nation-state cyberwarfare and cyber conflict in the
context of geopolitics and international studies. The emergence of nation-state cyber conflict has
increased in frequency and severity in the last decade. In order to investigate what renders
cyberwarfare a new and unique challenge to specific geopolitical climates and international
systems at large, research on state-level cyber conflict within bilateral relationships—all of which
cyber activity is significantly prevalent—is presented in the following three case studies: USChina, US-Iran, and US-Russia. Findings of these three case studies are used in subsequent
analysis to articulate the specific ways in which state cyber conflict differs from conventional state
kinetic warfare. Finally, after characterizing cyber conflict and the new challenges it presents to
geopolitics, these defining qualities are situated into the current debate surrounding the
deterioration of the liberal international order. I conclude that nation-state cyberwarfare exploits
the postwar interconnected transparency of liberalism, and fundamentally challenges the
continuity of US hegemony and the liberal order.

Keywords: cyber conflict, cyberwarfare, espionage, liberal international order, national
security, cybersecurity, cyberspace
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Introduction
In a world governed by nation-states that is increasingly reliant on digital systems, it is no
surprise that national security is correspondingly becoming synonymous with cybersecurity.
Although the scope of cyber conflict is broad and continues to expand with the prominence of
new technologies such as IoT devices, along with the rise of non-state actors such as cybercriminal enterprises and hacktivist groups in their use of cyber methods to achieve deliberate
goals, the scope of this thesis is focused solely on nation-state cyber conflict. In the last decade,
the world has witnessed an increasing prevalence of nation-state cyber operations, and according
to Evan Kohlmann, CIO at US-based business risk and threat intelligence firm Flashpoint (and
also where I have been working as a software engineer intern since June), “the world is going to
see more coordinated cyber operations from state-sponsored actors.”1 The effectiveness of statesponsored cyber operations in particular is due to their advanced capability and resources; often,
these actors are referred to as APT groups, referencing the advanced persistent threat that they
pose. Since only 2010, nation-state utilization of cyber approaches, methods and techniques have
ensued unprecedented outcomes, ranging from physical destruction of nuclear facilities and
intrusion into electrical power grids, to democratic election hacking and systematic theft of
intellectual property at nearly every sector of society. Despite some warranted skepticism
surrounding aggrandized fear of an imminent “cyber Pearl Harbor,” this unconventional type of
conflict is undoubtedly impacting state relationships and broader political trends, and vice versa.
The sources in the literature review to follow are primarily derived from books, academic
journals, news articles, and published reports. This thesis examines relevant scholarship and case
studies of three nation-state bilateral relationships to synthesize the unique qualities of state
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cyber conflict and how they differ from state kinetic warfare, in order to more broadly discuss
the role of cyber conflict in implicating and challenging the unipolar US-led power distribution
and liberal international order.
Methodology
The exploration aim of this thesis is two-fold. Primarily, I will draw from case study
findings to elucidate aspects and ways in which state cyber conflict differs from conventional
modes of kinetic warfare, and add to aspects already defined in literature. Once these qualities
that constitute cyber conflict are established, how these qualities interact with broader world
systems will become a part of a larger attempt to situate implications of cyberwarfare within the
current debate of the shifting LIO. Nation-state cyber conflict and operations in this thesis is not
limited to only cyber “attacks,” but also includes cyber espionage and information warfare. The
exact definition of cyberwarfare tends to vary depending upon the lens through which it is
analyzed, and sometimes does not include espionage or disinformation tactics; however, for the
purpose of contextualizing cyber strategy within nation-state relationships, these prominent areas
of cyber operations will be included in case study analysis and discussion.
Particularly, I will explore how state governments utilize cyber strategies to act on
foreign policy objectives, assert their own state power or alter existing power dynamics, and
integrate them into approaches to bilateral relationships. Individually, each of the three case
studies will scrutinize approaches, methods, and consequences of cyberwarfare and cyber
conflict in the following significant state bilateral relationships, all of which cyber conflict has
played a considerable role: the US and China, the US and Iran, the US and Russia. These four
nation-states were chosen particularly due to their advanced use and demonstration of cyber
capability and record of willingness to utilize cyberattack methods in order to act on a state

3

objective or attain a state goal. In addition to their relevance, these studies are necessary in order
to understand the nuanced differences between how these cyber powers approach this novel type
of warfare, what state objectives are actioned on by using cyber methods, and what broader
consequences, if any, cyber conflict presents to each unique bilateral relationship. Each of the
three chosen relationships involve the United States, and this is intentional; because one of the
ultimate goals of this thesis is to explore the geopolitical power implications of state cyber
conflict within the context of the western-led liberal order, the implications for continuity of US
power and hegemonic status will be of particular interest. There is no existing literature that
focuses specifically on the propensity of cyber conflict to challenge the LIO. Before attempting
to address this in later discussion, the following section will review relevant literature by
introducing important background of nation-state cyberwarfare, and will briefly substantiate the
importance of exploring this topic in the current context of international relations.
This research was designed based on my interest in the intersection of the traditionally
separate realms of technologically-dominated fields of computer science and cybersecurity, and
the field of international studies. Cyberwarfare and cyber conflict, especially at the nation-state
level, is a topic which ought to be examined and considered with an interdisciplinary approach as
it necessitates both technical and geopolitical knowledge. Given my background in computer
science and international studies, I aim to contribute not only to the dialogue on the topic, but
also to the synergy of both fields within scholarship, as they increasingly become more relevant
to one another. I welcome the use of technical sources, and plan to incorporate useful technical
information into my research and analysis.
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Literature Review
The introduction of cyber conflict into the scope of international relations is relatively
recent. Most literature on the subject has been written in the last decade, and in an increasing
frequency within the last five years. Often, literature on the subject is concerned with urging
attention to the realm of cyberspace and its implications. Experts Nazli Choucri and David Clark
go beyond this; as they comprehensively place the cyber domain within the setting of
international relations, they introduce the cyber-IR model, in order to develop a “cyber-inclusive
view of international relations… to anticipate and respond to cyber threats, impacts on power
politics, and challenges to national security and international stability,” and contextualize the
“co-evolution” of both cyberspace and international relations.2 As cyberspace has been
established as the fifth domain following land, sea, air and space,3 and as national security is
increasingly synonymous with cybersecurity, it is growingly obvious that there is critical
bridging to be done between the fields of technology and foreign policy. Choucri and Clark’s
work within the Explorations in Cyber-IR Harvard-MIT project has made great strides to
integrate these already inextricably linked spheres of knowledge, while bringing expertise from
political science and computer science, respectively.
It is no surprise that cybersecurity is becoming more important at all levels of society, as
individuals and institutions rely more and more on digitized infrastructure. The World Economic
Forum’s Global Risks Report 2019, published at the beginning of this year, urges attention to
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Choucri, Nazli and David D. Clark. “International Relations in the Cyber Age: The Co-Evolution Dilemma.” Cambridge: MIT
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cyberspace and its potential for global impact. Massive data fraud and theft was ranked as the
fourth major global risk, alongside cyberattacks, closely ranked at fifth. As seen in Appendix A,
cyber-risks are situated in the high-impact and high-likelihood quadrant of the WEF Global
Risks Landscape graph—second only to environmental risks. As denoted in their report, these
figures signify the “instabilities [which] are being caused by the deepening integration of digital
technologies into every aspect of life.”4 With more specificity, the Worldwide Threat
Assessment, published by US intelligence and director of national intelligence at the time Daniel
Coats, expands further upon these aforementioned threats. The 2018 report mentions the
increased prevalence and availability of ransomware and malware attacks, and raises concerns
about the “increasingly damaging effects of cyber operations and the apparent acceptance by
adversaries of collateral damage.” Honing in on nation-state conflict, “states are using cyber
operations as a low-cost tool of statecraft,” using them “to achieve strategic objectives unless
they face clear repercussions.” A year later, an updated U.S. threat assessment report was
published for 2019. It more fervently maintains that United States’ foreign adversaries will
“increasingly use cyber capabilities—including cyber espionage, attack, and influence—to seek
political, economic, and military advantage.” On the ground, these mentioned cyber capabilities
translate into “steal[ing] information, influenc[ing] citizens, or disrupt[ing] critical
infrastructure.”5 A report on nation-state motives behind today’s advanced cyberattacks,
published by cybersecurity company FireEye acknowledges this range of nation-state cyber
operations, titling it a “shadowy battlefield” in which governments clash and co-exist “in a new,
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“The Global Risks Report 2019,” World Economic Forum, January 15, 2019.
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mostly invisible theater of operations.”6 This report, like several others, advocates that
cyberattacks are not arbitrary, one-off, meaningless acts of state aggression.7 Rather it argues that
cyberattacks have “distinctive characteristics, which include everything from motivation to target
to type of attack,” and that they are “not an end in [themselves].”8
Senior fellow at the George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland
Security, Isaac Porche, comments on the prevalence of these types of cyber operations, claiming
“nation-states and their proxies are spying and attacking in cyberspace across national borders
with regularity.”9 Porche claims nation-state cyber-wars are not only a thing of the future, but of
the present. Because of the severe lack of international norms and agreement concerning
cyberspace, targeted cyber operations never meet the criteria of an act of war or aggression;
however, if there were norms in place, perhaps some of these advanced and impactful attacks
would no longer “fall into a gray area below the threshold of total war.”10 This gap in
international frameworks is an exploitable uncertainty, according to Porche, and one that is
worth attention, especially in light of the threat posed to critical infrastructure.11 International
and domestic frameworks that apply to kinetic warfare are outdated and irrelevant when acts of
aggression from the cyber domain come into play; long-existing theories cannot be readily
imported into handling nation-state cyber operations. At the very minimum, our institutions and
norms must be applicable to this undeniably emerging pattern of warfare.
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Kenneth Geers et al. “WORLD WAR C: Understanding Nation-State Motives Behind Today’s Advanced Cyber Attacks,”
FireEye, (2014): 3. https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/fireeye-wwc-report.pdf
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Mike Walls, “Nation-States: Why They Hack.” EdgeWave. (April, 2015): 1-12. http://www.edgewave.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/EdgeWave_NationStates_WhyTheyHack.pdf
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Vulnerabilities, especially those found within critical infrastructure, intelligence agencies,
and institutional systems, present cause for concern; over the last decade, nation-states, including
the United States have witnessed sophisticated attacks and exploits. Some of these significant
attacks will be discussed later in the three nation-state bilateral relationship case studies.
Increased severity and increased frequency of cyberattacks warrant further focused exploration
on this topic.
Rolling out new IoT devices, software, and expanding the amount of people who access
mobile and internet devices regularly only increases the potential for new system vulnerabilities
and their exploits by malicious actors. In addition, the speed at which this domain changes
surpasses the realistic amount of time for countries and international organizational bodies to
negotiate and legislate.12 From a chart included in the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment
Report published by US intelligence, it is evident that since 2007, there has been a significant
jump in the total countries with cyberattack capability (See Appendix B). It is reasonable then to
place importance on up-to-date data for both the technical exploits and the geopolitical affairs
relevant to nation-state cyber strategy, especially due to its changing nature. In his book War in
Cyberspace, former government official and counterterrorism expert Richard Clarke asserts that
“cyber war is a wholly new form of combat, the implications of which we do not yet fully
understand.”13 He comments further on the inherent nature of cyberwarfare which renders it
different than 20th century warfare, and which will be the subject of discussion following the
three case studies.
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Tarah Wheeler, “In Cyberwar, There are No Rules,” Foreign Policy Magazine, September 12, 2018,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/in-cyberwar-there-are-no-rules-cybersecurity-war-defense/
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Case Studies
Each of the three case studies will begin by contextualizing recent and current
background of the bilateral relationship, including points of conflict or tension. State cyber
activity will follow the background section, and will be organized by major themes or trends; the
thematic breakdown of each bilateral relationship is not intended to simplify or overly generalize
the cyber conflict that exists or has existed between any given two states, but rather is meant to
help organize sporadic incidents from the last decade and frame them in a relevant geopolitical
context. Based on findings from this section of each study, I will lastly discuss broader
objectives of what the particular nation-state utilizes cyber activity to achieve. In the field of
cybersecurity, the cyber kill chain is a common framework used to identify, trace, assess and
understand the stages of a cyberattack (See Appendix C).14 The final step of this cyber kill chain
is Actions on Objectives, which serves to pinpoint goals and motivations behind a given
cyberattack, which “vary greatly depending on the threat actor,” ranging from “political,
financial, or military gain.”15 The state cyber activity section of each case study can be thought
of as the ‘actions’ component, while the last section speaks to the ‘objectives’ and motivations
behind the state’s cyber operations at large. The goal is to articulate what objectives state actors
acted on through cyber operations, and how the state actors used cyber operations to act on these
objectives. The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis is another technical approach to
understanding cyberattacks, and it is worth noting the emphasis this model gives to
understanding the social-political relationship and degree of persistence between adversary and
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“The Cyber Kill Chain,” Lockheed Martin, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html
Spitzner, Lance. “Applying Security Awareness to the Cyber Kill Chain,” SANS Security Awareness. May 31, 2019.
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victim (See Appendix D).16 The case studies within this thesis have aims similar to these two
technical models; however, rather than focusing on a particular incident, general trends of state
cyber operation and activity will be of focus.
United States and China. Since the emergence of liberal international institutions during the
postwar era, US and Chinese relations have continued to shift. At the dawn of the new century,
US was paving the way for Chinese integration into liberal institutions such as the WTO. Prior,
China had been on the outside of the liberal emergence that the US was leading; however normal
trade relations between the two were established by 2000, and by 2006, China was the US’
second-biggest trade partner. Global liberal integration continued, and China was increasingly
recognized as an emerging power, becoming the world’s second largest economy. China
witnessed rapid change and benefited from the liberal institutions and integration, although it is
not a democratic state.17 However, the rest of the 21st century US-Chinese relations have been
characterized by conflict involving trade disputes and deficits. While continuing to prioritize
their bilateral and economic relationship, during the Obama administration, cyberespionage
became a topic of disagreement between the two leaders. As they agreed on steps towards
climate change accords and concerns for denuclearization, the discussion of cyber activity served
as a point of contention. In months prior, the US had accused Chinese corporations of statesponsored cyber espionage, including theft of US military and economic secrets; this was met by
only Chinese denial. The US warned that Chinese hacking and cyberespionage threatened the
bilateral relationship both sides had been working toward. President Obama suggested that if this
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Sergio Caltagirone, Christopher Betz, and Andrew Pendergast. “The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis.” Center for Cyber
Threat Intelligence and Threat Research. July 5, 2013. http://www.activeresponse.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/diamond.pdf
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cyber activity continued, it would give rise to a “difficult problem in the economic relationship”
as well.18
Some of this economic conflict has occurred jointly with increasing cyber activity
(specifically, economic espionage and hacking), which both states claimed they were a victim of.
During the Trump administration, this trade war has only intensified, and some initial tariffs
were placed in response to cyber activity.19 The preceding bilateral relations between the two
nation-states has underlined the way in which cyber operations continue to play a role in this
relationship.
Prior to the Sunnylands Summit in 2013, the US established a branch of the military
dedicated to cyber affairs (USCC) and additionally publicly declared “cyberspace as a new
domain of warfare.”20 According to expert Amy Chang, author of Warring State: China’s
Cybersecurity Strategy, these two US actions had significant implications for how China
perceived American motives at the time; Chinese media interpreted this as a threatening step
towards a new destabilizing ‘cyber arms race,’ much like a cyber-version of the Cold War. This
prompted some sentiment for China to “race in response, to ensure [they do] not fall behind.21
The US would again (unintentionally) threaten the Chinese perception of their motives
and intentions; in 2013, whistleblower Edward Snowden leaked confidential NSA strategy
information which included a covert surveillance operation that amassed global communication
data (the project known as PRISM). Other findings included NSA infiltration and exploitation of
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Jackie Calmes and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. and China Move Closer on North Korea, but Not on Cyberespionage,” The New
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“U.S. Relations with China,” Council on Foreign Relations.
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Ibid.
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top-level Chinese military officials’ computers. Ultimately, this leak proved the NSA’s cyber
espionage efforts were directed towards other nation-states, including China. According to
Chang, these disclosures “reversed momentum towards what could have been a breakthrough in
U.S.-China cyber relations”22 as witnessed during the Sunnylands summit. China used the
Snowden leaks to point out US hypocrisy and “[show] once again that China falls victim to
cyberattacks” when faced with cyber espionage accusations from the US, instead of attempting
to cooperate towards a bilateral agreement.23 Since Chinese leader Xi Jinping came to power, he
has emphasized network security and informatization as two major components of the Chinese
government’s national security agenda. Tensions and developments in cyberspace have caused
“negative externalities” on U.S.-China relations, and are crucial in defining broader trends of
state cyber conflict approach.24 This next section of the case study is intended to survey
prominent aspects of state cyber conflict and state cyber operations specifically within the USChina bilateral relationship.
State-sponsored cyber activity. Within the last decade, China as a leading cyber power has been
heavily associated with economic espionage, and this is not unwarranted; China’s state cyber
operations are predominantly focused on economic espionage efforts. The US National
Counterintelligence Executive office (NCIX) has described Chinese state cyber actors as “the
world’s most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage.”25 Although cyber
espionage is not always included in the definition of cyberwarfare, China’s extensive cyber
espionage campaign has implicated and continues to threaten the security of the US government

22

Chang, 38.
Ibid.
24
Chang, 12.
25
“How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the
World.” White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy. (June 2018): 1-36.
23
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as well as many other states, industries and institutions. The Council on Foreign Relations
database of cyber operations incidents now classifies 123 of 128 Chinese cyber operations as
being of espionage intent.26 The US FBI defines economic espionage as “foreign powersponsored or coordinated intelligence activity… designed to unlawfully or clandestinely
influence… or obtain” proprietary information in areas such as technology, finance and
government policy.27 This includes economic intelligence, confidential trade information, and
intellectual property. Further, the resulting ‘theft’ from economic espionage benefits the
perpetrating state, while causing “significant economic losses” to the victim (often by
undermining costs for research and development).28 It is worth noting that the clandestine nature
of espionage, especially through cyber means (as is the focus here), renders comprehensive and
complete measures of Chinese efforts and/or impacts much more difficult. Knowledge of such
efforts is limited not only to what is publicly released, but is also limited to what efforts have
been recognized and attributed. The major public beginnings of US-Chinese cyber conflict
begins also with the first ever instance of state charges against an alleged state cyber actor.29
Although, it is important to keep in mind that cyber espionage had already been occurring less
publically for some years—CSIS dates their Significant Cyber Events timeline back to 2006, for
example listing China’s hacking the Department of State’s networks and “download[ing]
terabytes of information.”30 In 2014, the FBI indicted five Chinese hackers, all of whom were
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The Council on Foreign Relations database is available for download from Council on Foreign Relations, undated.
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations#CyberOperations
27
“What is Economic Espionage?” Federal Bureau of Investigation, (2019) https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-economicespionage
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Daniel Liberto, “Economic Espionage,” Investopedia, (2019) https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economic-espionage.asp
29
Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order (New York: PublicAffairs 2016), 137.
30
“Significant Cyber Incidents,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November, 2019.
https://www.csis.org/programs/technology-policy-program/significant-cyber-incidents
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officers in Unit 61398 of China’s PLA.31 The FBI’s charges included stealing confidential
internal strategy data and other manufacturing and technology business intellectual property
from U.S. subsidiaries such as U.S. Steel Corporation and other private companies.
Based on their research and observation, security firm Mandiant concluded that one of
the most prominent, persistent, and “prolific cyber espionage groups” is confidently believed to
be the PLA’s Third Department (Unit 61398).32 China is known in the cybersecurity world for its
focus on espionage with an extensive range of targets, from commercial to political; for example,
during the 2008 US presidential election, the campaigns of both Obama and McCain were
victims of a massive cyber espionage operation led by the Chinese government, which intruded
and penetrated these networks to export internal data.33 In 2015, 70 percent of America’s
corporate intellectual property theft [was] believed to originate from China.34 More recently, the
‘advanced persistent threat’ of China has had implications in its recent trade war with the US;
fear of this threat has spurred heavy tariffs as well as a ban on giant telecommunications firms’
products (Huawei and ZTE), as the US is distrusting of these products due to their close ties with
the Chinese government, and government-sponsored espionage. Some of the surrounding fears
include the possibility that the government encourages the “install[ation] [of] backdoors into its
products which would allow China to spy on network traffic, potentially on a global scale.”35
The US fears Huawei’s success in developing global 5G networks “will give Beijing an

31

“U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers For Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations And A Labor Organization For
Commercial Advantage,” U.S. Department of Justice, July 14, 2015.
32
“APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” Mandiant. Accessed November 12, 2019.
https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf
33
Michael Isikoff, “Chinese hacked Obama, McCain campaigns, took internal documents, officials say.” NBC News. (2013)
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/52133016/t/chinese-hacked-obama-mccain-campaigns-took-internal-documents-officialssay/#.Xfcu5ufYrBJ
34
Ian Bremmer, “These 5 Facts Explain the Threat of Cyberwarfare., TIME Magazine. June 19, 2015.
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35
Matt Burgess, “Is China Really Using Huawei to Hack the World’s Communications?” WIRED Magazine, January 25, 2019.
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unprecedented opportunity to attack critical infrastructure and compromise intelligence
sharing...” potentially entailing “cyberattacks on public utilities, communication networks and
key financial centers.”36
Units 61398 and 61486 of China’s PLA are two out of many Chinese cyber espionage
groups targeting political and military intelligence in their efforts, as well as generally any “info
to bolster China's economic competitiveness.”37 Over two dozen US Department of Defense
weapons programs have been hacked and had data compromised. The major Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) breach had been occurring since 2013, but was not fully recognized or
released until 2015, and not officially attributed to China until 2018. The Chinese state group
behind the attack compromised 22 million records of personal information, ranging from security
data on military and intelligence personnel, to fingerprint data of almost six million people. This
severely threatened the national security of the US; the breached confidential data would enable
the Chinese government to identify US covert spies working abroad. China’s Ministry of State
Security (MSS), another governmental agency responsible for cyber operations, “reportedly
combined medical data stolen from Anthem insurance, travel records from United Airlines and
OPM security files to create a more complete picture of US officials,” worth noting to highlight
the strategic breadth and ability of these state actors. Former counsel at NSA, Joel Brenner,
termed the OPM incident “a significant blow” to American intelligence.38
In addition to government intelligence and intellectual property, Chinese state-sponsored
actors have also been linked to theft of confidential US military and defense data. This has been
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exemplified by significantly similar-looking stealth fighter jets developed recently, and have
even been referred to as “knockoffs” of US-designed jets.39
China’s state-sponsored cyber espionage and operations described above reflect efforts to
act on unique state objectives. This includes China’s desire to reduce the ‘technology gap’
between it and the US; their targeting of research and innovation data corresponds to this
objective, as “China doesn’t want to… run the risk of remaining second-tier manufacturing
specialists that lack innovation needed to become global technology leaders” while relying on
advanced technologies from other states.40 Additionally, China’s state objectives include
upholding and maintaining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Military development is a key
way in which China sees this as being done, as their cyber operations have reflected the goal of
military modernization, “while simultaneously preparing for the possibility of militarized cyber
conflict in the future.”41
United States and Iran. Understanding the “extremely sensitive”42 US-Iran bilateral relationship
contextualizes the objectives acted on by both states in their state-sponsored cyber activity.
Dating back to the end of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iran hostage crisis, diplomatic
tension has underscored their relations, as the US has continued to maintain a physical military
presence in the region. Economic relations between the two have similarly been strained as a
result of many factors; the Clinton administration imposed a complete embargo on Iran in 1995,
and in 1996 established the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), placing sanctions on
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non-American companies investing in the Iranian oil and natural gas industries.43 The US-Iran
relationship in the early 2000s was newly fraught with fears of nuclear build-up and aggression
as Iran began their development of nuclear facilities, and denied US accusations of a secretive
nuclear weapons program. Sanctions on Iran by the US, EU, and the UN continued into the start
of the new century.44 As will be discussed in the following section, it is this tension that defined
the relationship until cyber operations became an additional point of agitation. The discovery of
the Stuxnet malware and Operation Olympic Games in 2010 would prove to be a turning point in
Iranian state approach to cyber conflict. It was not until 2015 that diplomatic efforts from Iran
and the P5+1 finally reached an agreement on the long-term Iran Nuclear Deal (formally known
as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), under which Iran agreed to limit nuclear
development activity and allow UN inspection in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.
However more recently, President Donald Trump withdrew the US from this deal and reinstated
decades-old sanctions, which only worsened relations between the US and Iran.45
State-sponsored cyber activity. In an attempt to define themes of Iranian state-sponsored cyber
operations in relation to (probable) motives, several sources and scholars have articulated
retaliation as a necessary factor to understanding Iranian hacking. Hacking activity has been
originating from Iran since the early 2000’s, largely in the form of “patriotic hacking”—less
sophisticated operations such as website defacements, or domestically focused activity, not
initiated by a legitimate branch of the Iranian military.46 However, in 2010, Iran became known
as one of the world’s first public targets and victims of serious state-sponsored cyberwarfare

43

Lionel Beehner, “Timeline: U.S.-Iran Contacts,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 9, 2007.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/timeline-us-iran-contacts
44
“US-Iran relations: A brief history,” BBC News, June 21, 2019 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24316661
45
Ibid.
46
Hodgson et al., Fighting Shadows in the Dark, Understanding and Countering Coercion in Cyberspace, (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2019): 23.

17

upon the discovery of the Stuxnet virus. The Stuxnet virus was a global turning point for
cyberwarfare and state cyber operations, with implications that extend far outside of the US-Iran
relationship; it is considered by many to be the first direct example of cyberwarfare and the first
cyberwarfare weapon,47 and was in fact the “first cyberattack ever designed to directly damage
physical equipment.”48 This malware was designed to physically destroy the centrifuges of Iran’s
nuclear facilities, and was attributed to an US-Israeli joint operation. It was likely designed in
2005-2007, and was persistent until its discovery in 2010; by this time, it had destroyed over a
thousand centrifuges of Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.49 This directed operation precipitated a
fundamental shift in how Iran would approach cyber operations at the state level from then on, as
well as what their motives behind cyber operations would be. Retaliation in the form of
advancing cyber activity was quickly seen, as soon as 2011.50 Iran invested in a focused effort to
invest and develop cyber capabilities,51 as was demonstrated by their establishment of their
Supreme Cyberspace Council.52
Following the 2010 detection of the consequential Stuxnet worm, a string of advanced
and arguably retaliatory cyberattacks originated from Iran. The first Iranian-attributed cyber
espionage campaign (Madi, targeting the US and Iran’s regional adversaries), the first delivery of
the Shamoon malware (targeting Saudi Aramco, one of the world’s largest oil companies and
Qatari RasGas corporation53), and the first series of DDoS attacks on some of the largest US
banks (Operation Ababil) all only within the second half of 2012.54 These cyberattacks served as
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the first glimpse into Iran’s advanced, bold, and rapidly-developed cyber capabilities, as well as
their intention for their cyber operations.
Aside from geostrategic retaliation, Iran has also demonstrated their influence of
retaliation as motive for direct industry-targeted cyberattacks. In 2014, Iranian state-sponsored
hackers launched a destructive cyberattack on Sands Las Vegas Casino Corporation; data was
stolen and destroyed, computers were wiped, and the company was frozen by this malware
infection.55 The retaliation aspect of this operation is evident, as the casino’s owner Sheldon
Adelson is a vocal pro-Israel who had publicly suggested the US drop nuclear bombs on Iran.56
The nation-state actors behind the attack made their retaliation known, leaving behind a message
on the infiltrated computers which denounced “encouraging the use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction” as a crime.57 Iranian state cyber operations have been quite regionally focused in
the past, and targeted at countries nearby such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, however Iran
increasingly targets US industry and technologies as well, threatening US national security. Like
other state actors, Iran targets specific commercial industries in order to develop and bolster
those of its own. At large, previously targeted industries have included 1) military and defenserelated; 2) natural resources and energy; 3) telecommunications; 4) infrastructure.58
Certain Iranian state-sponsored cyber-active groups (such as Rocket Kitten) often target
US defense firms in their cyber operations, and are likely motivated by an agenda to modernize
their military and improve and advance their missile and space programs using stolen
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“proprietary and sensitive US military technology.”59 Other groups (such as APT33) have used
advanced cyber techniques to target US aerospace and civil aviation firms,60 as well as energy
sector companies, aligning with Iran’s agenda to improve one of its largest industries and exports
— petrochemical production and technology.61 Operation Newscaster was a notable example of
an elaborate and long-term cyber espionage operation, targeting intelligence and public policy
information from military and political figures of Western states (including the US) as well as
other regional adversaries from 2011-2014.62 Espionage efforts have also been aimed at stealing
intellectual property and proprietary data from American corporations such as HBO, as well as
US financial institutions and information technology companies.63 Iran responded by launching
massive DDoS attacks against the US financial sector in 2012, after the US launched sanctions
against Iran and only two years after Stuxnet was exposed.64 However, the US and Israel also
jointly took part in developing sophisticated cyber espionage, sabotage, and “cyber-collection”
malware (Flame and Duqu) aimed at hindering Iranian nuclear development and conducting
reconnaissance. These persistent-engaging attacks were discovered soon after Stuxnet.65 Iran has
additionally posed a risk to CNI in the past. In 2015, an Iranian cyberattack caused a complete
power outage of the electrical grids in over half of Turkey’s provinces; from “computers,
airports, traffic lights, hospitals, lights, elevators, refrigeration, water and sewage, everything
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simply stopped” for over 12 hours.66 Although not a crucial element of US-Iranian bilateral
relations, many experts interpreted this destructive attack as a “flex” of Iranian ability to disrupt
CNI.67 Not long before this, security firm Cylance published a report detailing Iran’s Operation
Cleaver, which had at the time recently been detected as penetrating, attacking, “establishing
persistence in, and extracting highly sensitive materials” of critical infrastructure targets of
several nation-states, and mainly of the United States.68
In addition, foreign academic institutions and universities are a frequent target. In 2018 it
was found that Iran state-sponsored groups executed cyberattacks on 176 universities across 21
foreign countries; in the US alone, it was alleged in a 2018 indictment of nine Iranian nationals
that 31 terabytes of documents and data had been stolen from over 140 universities,69 as well as
30 companies and 5 government agencies.70 Similarly to motivations underlying economic
espionage, Iran’s targeting of academic intellectual property and unpublished research is derived
from their objective of advancing their defense capabilities, development of nuclear power, and
monitoring expatriates.71 This ongoing espionage campaign was led by Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—a branch of their state armed forces—and was motivated
by desired access to data, to ultimately benefit the Iranian government and peripheral state
institutions.72
According to the National Counterintelligence and Security Center’s (NCSC) 2018
publication on foreign economic espionage in cyberspace, Iran is predicted to continue
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penetrating US and allied network infrastructure for espionage efforts as well as to “position
itself for future cyberattacks.”73 As Iran’s economy is significantly reliant on the oil industry and
petroleum revenue, its longevity “will depend on growth in non-oil industries” and efforts of
economic-diversification; a primary motive for cyber espionage efforts across industries.
Similarly, cyber espionage targeting industry and academic institutions are motivated by
attempts to lessen the gap in science, technology and research between Iran and Western states. 74
Aggression within the US-Iranian bilateral relationship has served as a “symbol of
Western meddling in the region” from Iran’s frame of reference. In addition to economic
objectives, Security operations and analysis expert Mike Walls posits the Iranian perspective as
“also impacted by theology,” as it serves as an additional motivation behind Iranian cyber
operations.75 In a RAND Corporation 2019 publication on cyberspace coercion, the authors
suggest that “Iran’s efforts suggest an orchestrated attempt to challenge its regional adversaries
and gain a more prominent place as a regional power.”76 Objectives of asserting regional
dominance as well as religious dominance are interwoven. Expanding their sphere of influence in
the Middle East would require Iran to challenge both the “military and economic influence of
Western countries [maintaining] a presence in the region” as well as “destabilize those Sunni
Islamic governments which are historically allied with” or supported economically or militarily
by the West.77 These Western alliances with Sunni states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Jordan and Egypt, continue to create regional tension as Iran exerts its dominance. The regional
religious distinction between Iran’s Shi’a state and the more popular Sunni sect of Islam is
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significant because hostility between the two is a “root cause of the persistent tension in the
region.”78 In Why Iran Hacks of his multiple-part series, Walls explains “as Iran continues to
leverage the threat of nuclear weapons in the kinetic world, it is actively converting threat to
action in the cyber domain to achieve its regional objectives.”79
In addition to utilizing cyber means to act on regional objectives, Iran’s cyber activities
and operations coincide with broader geostrategic progressions. A RAND Corporation
publication from 2019 acknowledges the timing of turning points in Iran’s cyber activity in
comparison with that of diplomatic agreement or other significant events. US tightening of
Iranian sanctions in 2012 was met with a string of systematic Iranian DDoS cyberattacks targeted
at US banks and government agencies, affecting “at least 46 financial institutions and
companies”;80 in 2015 this series of cyberattacks finally came to an end, notably corresponding
to the signing of the JCPOA. Iran’s cyber operations resumed a regional focus at this time, with
limited identified efforts targeting the US.81
Bearing Iran’s tight correlation of cyber operations to geopolitics, it is no surprise why
members of the security community were and still are concerned about the implications likely to
follow the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. As most of the significant Iranian cyber operations
targeted at the US took place post-Stuxnet and pre-JCPOA (2011-2015), cybersecurity experts
have been fearing that with the end of US participation in the deal, will concurrently come the
end of this recent “lull” in Iranian cyberattacks.82
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At the end of 2018, a Wired article suggested “signs that the pushback [had] arrived.”83 It
quotes Eric Chien of security firm Symantec’s security and technology division, as he comments
on the noticeable “nation state motivations” of Iranian cyber activity, as well as the extent to
which it is “reactionary to the geopolitical world.” The recent attacks that have spurred thought
that Iran’s state-sponsored hacking has ramped up once again have been tied to Iran largely due
to the malware involved - a variant of Iran’s prior multi-use and severely destructive Shamoon
virus. Separately, another APT group attributed to Iran (Charming Kitten)—known for targeting
government and diplomatic sectors84—has recently been tied to attacks on US Treasury officials,
DC think tanks, and other similarly functioned groups. The murk of attribution remains, but
security researchers assert this “spike in Iranian hacking.”85
United States and Russia. The Cold War era, lasting until the early 1990’s, was defined by US
and (now) Russian bipolar power competition and geopolitical tension. In the post-Cold War era
and 21st century, largely comprised of increasing globalization and technological advancement,
the US-Russian relationship has not been marked by cooperation, even in the absence of formal
tension. Although optimistic sentiments have been made by many US presidents since the end of
the Cold War regarding the hope for better relations with Russia, obstacles have continued to
prevent this from manifesting. Tensions such as the US intervention and expansion of NATO,
have remained fundamental points of contention.
Both the US and Russia have subtly continued the Cold War policy of containment with
one another, as Russia attempts to “constrain American commercial advance, America to limit
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Russian territorial expansion.”86 Russia has continued to view US policy as imperialist,
disagreeing with their unipolar status and spreading of democracy, while pursuing their own
power revival and sphere of influence, beyond their regional confines, and into the global power
distribution. The post-Cold War US relatively succeeded in unipolar power dynamics, leading
shifts towards multilateral liberal integration and pushes to domestic democracy of others.87
More recently, consequential actions from the Russian state have only led to increased
tensions. The 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea caused relations to
“[plummet] to their lowest since the end of the Cold War.”88 Soon after in 2016, as will be
discussed in this study, the Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election has also
mangled the US-Russian bilateral relationship, resulting in anti-Russian sanctions and a bleak
outlook for the near future.89 This next section will briefly discuss the key aspects and events
from the US-Russia relationship concerning state-level cyber operations.
State-sponsored Cyber Activity. The destabilization and disinformation efforts of Russia’s statesponsored cyber operations are interwoven, and contribute to each other in order to act on state
objectives. Efforts range from political election interference to abuse of social media platforms.
In addition to technical cyber operations, Russian state actors have established online personas
on varying Internet platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, to “disseminate falsified news
stories and develop narratives sympathetic to Russia’s views.”90 As the spreading of
disinformation on media platforms is largely political in influencing public opinion, it also serves
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to undermine credible sources.91 Since at least 2007, the Russian state-sponsored cyber group
APT28 has conducted espionage to gather intelligence on defense and geopolitical issues, with
targets including the US.92 However, Russian state-sponsored cyber operations extend beyond
the scope of espionage; the intrusions and hacking of the 2016 US presidential election (mainly
the campaign of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton) emphasize the unique Russian focus on
information operations, sometimes referred to as “weaponization of information.”93
This pivotal operation targeted and penetrated the networks of the US Democratic Party,
ultimately stealing sensitive campaign strategy data, discussions, tactics as well as private
personal information of campaign officials and their email correspondence, which would then be
leaked to multiple websites and outlets (WikiLeaks, DCLeaks). Over 58,000 email messages
were published on WikiLeaks alone.94 This public release of documents escalated the Russian
espionage operation into “something far more menacing: political sabotage,” as stolen data was
also published under a fake persona known as Guccifer 2.0, a fabricated Romanian lonehacker.95 Despite these efforts to false-flag identity and distract attribution from the Russian
government, the DNC hack was attributed to two different Russian military intelligence branches
(FSB, GRU).96 It was later revealed that disinformation efforts were happening simultaneously
with network intrusion and public data breaching, as Facebook alone announced over 3,000
advertisements posted were linked to Russia during the time surrounding the 2016 presidential
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election.97 The aftermath included US indictment of several Russian intelligence and military
officials, and the infamous Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the election
concluded that Russia was in fact engaging in sophisticated campaigns of both disinformation
and destabilization; in addition to hacking the networks of the Democratic party and campaigns
and publishing the material, they additionally “conduct[ed] disinformation and social media
operations in the United States designed to sow social discord.”98
The Russian actions taken to destabilize the US presidential election and to spread
disinformation surrounding it largely correspond to their state objectives of interfering with the
western democratic political system, and thus undermining the credibility of western democracy,
as Russia has additionally afflicted European countries such as France and Germany with similar
cyber tactics.99
Russian objectives have largely remained since the Cold War era. During even this time,
disinformation campaigns existed in order to undermine and discredit US intelligence and
alliances, and to bolster Soviet power and influence, although the methodology was much
different (forgery, targeted assassination). Today, cyber operations allow Russia to not only
continue strategically acting on their objectives, but to do so in a systematic, technically skilled,
covert, difficult-to-trace manner—a manner in which capability and rules remain ill-defined and
competitive.100 Seth Jones, senior advisor to the CSIS, comments on Russian use of
“technologically-sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities, covert action, and information
operations” in order to not only strengthen their own power, but to also “[contribute] to a decline
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in American global power and influence.”101 Russian APTs, often branches of Russian military
intelligence (FSB, SVR) have targeted commercial companies, government agencies, political
parties, and IOs around the world,102 exemplified by destructive malware such as NotPetya,
targeting multinational corporations, for example.103 However, Russia exhibits a unique focus on
the energy sector in their state-led cyber operations, with a priority especially on power grids and
industrial control systems. According to security journalist Steven Musil, national energy,
nuclear and other critical infrastructure organizations have become frequent Russian targets “due
to their ability to cause immediate chaos, whether it's starting a blackout or blocking traffic
signals.” To make matters worse, these critical systems are often inherently “vulnerable because
of antiquated software and the high costs of upgrading infrastructure.”104
Sandworm, a prominent Russian state actor that has been active since at least 2014
(traced to Russian military branch GRU105), has particularly targeted power grids.106 Security
firm FireEye has linked Sandworm to a string of US energy facility intrusions discovered in
2014, “which were infected with the same Black Energy malware Sandworm would later use in
its Ukraine attacks.”107 Sandworm abruptly carried out attacks on Ukrainian electric utilities in
2015 and 2016, cutting off power to hundreds of thousands of people.108 The attackers gained
control of power distribution and control centers, shutting them down and offline, and going as
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far as to even disable backup power supply.109 This was the first ever blackout or outage attack;
although targeting Ukraine, it immediately raised concerns in the US, as experts still claim this
bold move was in fact a “flex” of Russian cyber capability, perhaps in order to present their
persistent threat to the US. These concerns proved valid, as Russian cyber activity on US grids
has continued and increased since these preliminary outage attacks on Ukraine. A 2018 DHS
Cyber + Infrastructure alert shed light on Russian state cyber activity that had “staged malware,
conducted spear phishing, and gained remote access into energy sector” and other sensitive
critical infrastructure networks, as well as “conducted network reconnaissance, moved laterally,
and collected information pertaining to [US] Industrial Control Systems” after attaining
access.110 Targets included government facilities, as well as a nuclear plant, and multiple power
plants.111
However, this unauthorized access goes both ways. It is important to note that the US has
been probing Russian infrastructure since at least 2012, mainly by conducting reconnaissance
into the Russian electric grid. More recently, the US has been admittedly more aggressive in
their approach to “defending forward” by implanting malware inside Russia’s state control
systems.112 Neither Russia nor the US has gone as far as to actually shut off the power of each
other’s grids; only the “persistent threat” of the others’ capability remains, which has thus stirred
dialogue about a new “digital cold war.”113 Yet in a domain of warfare that is loosely defined and
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barely legitimized, deterrence is not as clearly interpreted. Targeting specifically the Ukraine and
the US (and European countries to a lesser extent) epitomizes a challenging of western influence
on neighboring countries and the West as an entity.
Based on actions taken in the cyberspace domain, as expert Mike Walls suggests, it is
“conceivable that Russian officials view hacking, or more appropriately cyberwarfare, as a
political tool which, when employed, is extremely effective at helping a nation state achieve a
geopolitical goal.”114 A 2017 article published by the University of Washington’s School of
International Studies agrees with the link between Russian cyber operations and its geopolitical
objectives, suggesting “while Russia is concerned about Ukraine turning to the West, it is also
concerned with Ukraine’s moves to end its dependence on Russian energy sources.”115
Objectives deduced from Russian strategy and cyber operations indicate a focus to to 1)
undermine Western influence, and 2) target the energy industry.116
National security correspondent David Sanger suggests the motives for American probing
into Russian control systems as serving “partly as a warning, and partly to be poised to conduct
cyber strikes if a major conflict broke out between Washington and Moscow.117 This judgment
aligns with the concept of attempting to “hold targets at risk” as well as being prepared for
retaliation or an offensive cyberattack if tension in the bilateral relationship were to intensify.
Whether preparation for retaliation or offensive attack, the capability of Russian access into
critical infrastructure could still serve as a legitimate threat and display of power and presence.
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Cyber Conflict: What Makes It Unique?
After an overview of the four leading cyber powers’ approaches to cyber strategy and
cyber conflict in regards to their bilateral relationships, we can begin to examine the intrinsic
qualities of cyber conflict that exist across different methods, objectives, or state actors. Doing so
will encourage later discussion on how cyber conflict fundamentally interacts with the LIO.
The goal of this section is to explore what makes cyber conflict a uniquely new challenge
for nation-states, by drawing from relevant literature as well as from this paper’s case studies on
US-China, US-Iran, and US-Russia. Nazli Choucri, director of the multi-disciplinary ECIR MITHarvard research collaboration, has significantly contributed to defining key characteristics of
cyberspace, which she insists are “reshaping contemporary international relations theory, policy,
and practice.”118 These seven attributes, (seen in Appendix E) include 1) temporality 2)
physicality, 3) permeation, 4) fluidity, 5) participation, 6) attribution, and 7) accountability.119
Time and space, evident in the first two of Choucri’s characteristics of cyberspace, are
two of the most prominent ways in which cyber conflict is unique from kinetic conflict. As also
evidenced by Segal in his distinction of cyber espionage (from traditional espionage), “[cyber
espionage] is easier, happens at a much greater pace, and produces a greater haul,” and while
“industrial espionage happened over years and decades; cyber espionage takes place over hours
and days.”120 Additionally, the very nature of “zero-day exploits” as advanced cyberattacks are
defined by their temporal aspect; these attacks are exploitations of unknown vulnerabilities to the
developer until they are exposed, giving them zero days to patch the vulnerability. 121
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In terms of physicality, cyber operations obviously are not physical in nature, as kinetic warfare
and battlefield warfare are. The ability of cyber weapons to “transcend constraints of geography
and physical location” allows for efforts such as persistent engagement on an adversary’s
network, and reconnaissance (an advanced form of targeted spying; the first step in the
cyberattack cyber kill chain, closely defined to espionage122).123 If intended for espionage,
persistent access on a system can allow an easy entry to stealing data and gathering intelligence;
additionally, it can be utilized to scope out the virtual landscape of an attack target. Admiral
Mike McConnell comments on the potential of remote exploit or attack on critical networks and
information, in which “no flotilla of ships or intercontinental missiles or standing armies can
defend against such remote attacks located not only well beyond our borders, but beyond
physical space, in the digital ether of cyberspace.”124 This point also speaks to the asymmetry of
cyberwarfare; unlike conventional war methods, this conflict doesn’t require large nation-state
militias, and is instead more typically technically-skilled individual actors working for a
government that could theoretically have the ability to shut down a grid system.125
The phenomenon of malware recycling is unique to cyber conflict, and encompasses both
the permeation and fluidity aspects outlined by Choucri. When a nation-state launches a missile,
or engages in battleground warfare with an opposing state, those strategies and tools aren’t
repurposed for later use by other states or actors. In state-level cyber operations, however,
malware, ransomware, viruses, are often deconstructed by various entities (security researchers
and firms along with the government) and pieces of the code are dissected, whether for
understanding the adversary’s capabilities, or for patching vulnerabilities, but different segments
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of malware can be sold and used again, as has been seen in even nation-state cyber conflict. The
US-Israeli-made Stuxnet worm, as discussed in the US-Iran case study of this thesis, has been
repurposed for acting on vastly different objectives. A 2013 NSA document leaked by Snowden
indicates concern and evidence that Iran demonstrated replicated techniques from US malware
such as Stuxnet, Flame, and Duqu in their well-known Shamoon malware.126 Shamoon is also an
example of an attack that has been modified by its creators to strike again, at different targets;
according to firm FireEye, the 2018 “Shamoon 2.0 [was] a reworked and updated version of the
malware [they] saw in the 2012 incident.127 This challenge, unique to cyberwarfare, is one of the
many new challenges that has emerged with the rise of cyber as a fifth domain of warfare.
Participation and attribution contribute to the opaqueness of cyber operations as well.
Although not the focus of this thesis, non-state actors with sophisticated technical skills (and at
times hired to execute governments’ cyber operations) blur the lines between state cyber
operations and non-state cybercrime, and present a unique challenge for nation-states combatting
and responding to this type of attack. Specific to the problem of attribution, while identifying the
actor behind malware campaigns and cyberattacks is a unique challenge of its own, “falseflagging” is also employed by sophisticated state APT actors in order to deceive and mislead
victims and the security community from correctly identifying the origin or identity of the attack.
Exemplified in this paper’s case study on US-Russia, as Russia publicly denied any involvement
during their DNC and US election hacking campaign, they intentionally disguised their identity
with a false persona of Romanian origin.128 Accountability goes hand-in-hand with the challenge

126

Kim Zetter, “The NSA Acknowledges What We All Feared: Iran Learns from US Cyberattacks,” WIRED Magazine,
February 10, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/02/nsa-acknowledges-feared-iran-learns-us-cyberattacks/
127
“FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region,” FireEye, December 1, 2016,
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html
128

Andy Greenberg, “Russian Hacker False Flags Work-Even After They’re Exposed,” WIRED Magazine, February 27, 2018,
https://www.wired.com/story/russia-false-flag-hacks/

33

of identifying and responding to cyber conflict, in ways it would not in conventional warfare.
Naturally, as correct attribution is difficult already, it is especially difficult to hold states
accountable for malware campaigns they only allegedly were behind. It is difficult to be held
accountable for cyber activity in the same way one may be for developing or testing nuclear
weapons, for example, as this approach to warfare does not require huge physical development
facilities or physically detectable testing.
The nature of certain cyber operations such as persistent engagement, network
penetration, probing and reconnaissance—as mentioned above when examining the temporal and
physical aspect of cyber conflict—also present a challenge while distinguishing benign,
defensive cyber activity from that of reconnaissance efforts in preparation for a targeted
malicious cyberattack. Active defense measures or monitoring can look very similar to
conducting reconnaissance, raising unprecedented questions such as whether or not
reconnaissance efforts should be treated like an attack, or how to respond to Russian or US
electrical grid probing and access to networks. Misinterpretation of another state’s activities in
cyberspace, or misattribution of attacks or operations could very possibly lead to escalation,
“especially if a malicious or self-interested actor were to route attacks on the other side through
US or Chinese servers during a tense period in the bilateral relationship,” for example.129 These
potential conflicts blur wartime and peacetime, and elucidate the gaps (or even irrelevancy) in
traditional definitions of offensive and defensive state behavior.
Cyber Conflict and the Liberal International Order
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Recent literature suggests the liberal international order (LIO) is evolving, and is no
longer the postwar system that it was once in the 20th century.130 Further, some experts argue it is
in crisis.131 Some such as the prominent scholar on American international relations John
Mearsheimer have presented evidence even indicating the end of the LIO.132 Despite consensus
on the declining or expired health of the liberal order, there are certain undeniable facts of the
current world stage and geopolitical climate that challenge the pillars of this US-led, rule-based
order, which are traditionally defined as democracy, open markets, multilateral cooperation,
security alliances, international institutions and U.S. hegemony.133
Current challenges have risen to fundamentally oppose the inherent system of the liberal
international order. For example, the 2008 and Eurozone crises served to challenge the
underlying assumptions and arguments of the true feasibility of the LIO, by revealing intrinsic
flaws of the open self-regulating market. Another threat to this open system is the “return to
great-power rivalry,” which senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and author Thomas Wright
argues was inevitable. He claims that growing “geopolitical competition” amongst world powers
such as China and Russia have contributed to the “clash of social models” coming to a head;
after decades of interconnectedness and integration encouraged by the liberal order, global
powers have vulnerabilities.134
Similar to Wright, Mearsheimer claims that despite the once strong existence of the LIO,
it “contained the seeds of its own ruin” from the start. Former Prime Minister of Sweden
acknowledges the crisis of the LIO as well by illuminating key countries’ “isolationist
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sentiments” and revisionist powers becom[ing] more assertive,” as well as the “questioning of
free trade and the open global economy.”135 Senior distinguished fellow of the German Institute
for International and Security Affairs Hanns Maull adds to this, suggesting that the advance of
technology is the primary “driver of disorder” of the liberal global order, along with the “supplydemand in governance” and “eroding international cooperation.”136
Other evidence includes the rise of domestic populist national movements such as Brexit,
the declining public trust in government, and the election of other populist and nationalist
leaders. Donald Trump in the US has strayed from supporting basic principles of the LIO; as the
president of the supposed hegemon of this world order, his election raises questions about the
continuity and stability of the order today, as does China’s emergence as a potential leader, while
lacking a democracy and instead engaging with an authoritarian government. This thesis will
introduce nation-state cyber operations and conflict as another “driver of disorder” that is
beginning to additionally visibly challenge the liberal international order.
Power shift. Firstly, many of the emerging and established cyber powers the world has witnessed
in the last decade are not only non-western or non-democratic, but have been characterized as
being anti-democratic and anti-western. China and Russian particularly have challenged US
hegemony since long before this decade. Both non-Western states, they do not subscribe to the
same liberal principles of democracy that the West has for quite some time. Iran is an Islamic
republic, and in this way does not subscribe to secular principles of liberalism. All three of these
states have demonstrated their power struggles with the LIO in different forms, whether by the
threat of nuclear weapon development, or economic challenges. In challenging US hegemony
and exerting their own differing spheres of influence in contrast to Western influence, they have
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sought a multipolar global power distribution rather than one of US-led unipolarity. A rise of
these actors, via cyber advancement and superiority, and thus a shift towards a multipolar
distribution, would certainly challenge US hegemony and traditional trademark features of the
LIO — whether it continues or not.
Openness of the LIO. As discussed previously, cyberattacks are increasingly difficult to attribute
(especially with the rise of false-flagging), and this can cause serious issues when placing
internationally public blame or responsibility on another nation-state. Moreover, if governments
are able to execute attacks and escape attribution, there is very little incentive for states to
subscribe to policies of transparency and accountability. The lack of this type of international
agreement challenges the liberal openness and accountability that has surrounded battlefield
warfare and large-scale military campaigns for decades. The problem of attribution threatens the
accountability that is essential to international cooperation in the LIO.
Additionally, this renders cyber conflict intrinsically more difficult to regulate by an IO,
which has largely been the approach to handling international conflict within the LIO. IOs
regulate everything from trade, tariffs, and sanctions to the establishment of acts of aggression,
and appropriate responsive measures. The lack of legitimate agreement and difficulty of
attribution poses a threat of undermining the fundamentals of the LIO. Without transparency,
how will IOs continue to monitor state conflict? When a nation tests a missile, the world knows
almost immediately; when a nation constructs physical facilities for nuclear weapon
development, other states or IOs can physically observe this and monitor it. However, when a
nation tests a piece of malware, there is little to no way of knowing; when a nation begins
ramping up their cyber capability, this goes unknown until execution of sophisticated attacks, or
until malware is attributed to that state actor. One of the conditions of the 2016 JCPOA was IO
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routine monitoring on Iran’s nuclear development in order to keep Iran accountable and
compliant, however, is this regulation possible in an era of cyber tools and writing malware? The
lack of physical equipment renders this method of ensuring accountability in cyber conflict much
more difficult. Yet further, if the international community cannot reliably attribute attacks, there
is no perpetrator to hold accountable in the first place. Without fear of facing repercussions and
being held accountable from the global community and/or established international liberal
institutions, such as the UN and IOs, there seems to be little that prevents a nation from
developing and using these capabilities, especially if they can get away with it not being
attributed. Irony lies in the LIO’s ideals of maintaining an open, integrated, interconnected
system. Technology has allowed for this integration to happen, however this openness is now
being exploited by technologically sophisticated methods to undermine and challenge the LIO,
and the principles that it was built from.
Hegemonic correspondence to military strength. Global military primacy is a defining
characteristic of US hegemony in the LIO, as military strength often corresponds to effective
state hegemons. According to the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST), the political power of a
hegemon must be “backed up by projective military power.”137 This characteristic assumes
“strength both politically and economically” as well, as resources are necessary to maintain an
unrivaled military.138 Because state cyber operations and cyberattacks need not a hugelyresourced and organized, physical army or the legitimacy of a well-funded public state military,
cyber operations challenge the underlying notion that military strength is directly corresponding
to global power and hegemonic status. Cyberattacks are relatively much cheaper than traditional
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kinetic military campaigns.139 In addition, governments have been known to use non-state actors
to execute their state-led operations, leveraging their experience and technical skills to attain
cyber capability and potentially “wage war against an enemy with kinetic battlefield
superiority.”140 Thus, cyber operations prove a way to challenge the position of the hegemon in
ways kinetic warfare cannot. In the same vein, hegemonic states are generally assumed to have
the more developed and advanced infrastructure relative to the rest of the world, as they are
capable enough to provide public goods for other nations and have a large economy.141 However,
this “traditional power dynamics are undermined by the paradoxical idea that the most
technologically advanced countries are also the most dependent on digital infrastructure
which is inherently more susceptible to flaws and vulnerabilities in CNI, “and thus the most
vulnerable to a crippling cyber-attack.”142 Porche comments that “open and free societies are
more vulnerable than adversaries who exploit the tenets and principles of press freedoms.”143
These aspects challenge the traditionally-held military superiority of the hegemonic state in the
LIO; cyber conflict presents opportunities for less powerful, smaller and less-resourced
governments to exploit vulnerabilities of advanced systems within powerful nations, and thus
challenge the role of the hegemon in ways it could previously not. This is seen in each of the
three case studies, as China, Iran and Russia have gained the attention and concern from the US,
as all three have successfully engaged in some extent of cyber operations targeted at the US.
Cyber conflict allows for this type of asymmetric warfare; prior to cyber operations, smaller and
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less-resourced or legitimate forces would rarely, if ever, conduct offensive operations targeting
the world’s largest military.
Rules-based, but no rules. Defining offensive and defensive behavior challenges the rules-based
nature of the order. The LIO is largely defined as a rules-based international order. In the LIO
era, war is formally (usually) declared and there are international laws surrounding fair targets
and what constitutes an act of war or aggression, and how a nation can respond. Until there is
comprehensive work and agreement that addresses interpreting grey area threats such as
reconnaissance of network intrusion or power grid probing, this characteristic of cyber conflict
will undermine the liberal institutions and their ability to regulate conflict on an international
scale, and thus the LIO at large.
To again reference Choucri’s contribution to cyber international relations, she ultimately
asserts the “co-evolution of cyber domain and international relations,” which the research and
analysis presented in this thesis supports as well. Inherent features of cyber operations and
conflict challenge the current LIO, and will continue to shape its future. As this thesis has
presented evidence that cyber conflict challenges the LIO in ways that kinetic warfare does not,
it additionally supports Choucri’s reverse argument, specifically that geopolitics continue to
serve as a major objective of state cyber operations, as demonstrated in each of the three case
studies. Thus, these two seemingly separate realms are largely intertwined and continue to coevolve.
Conclusion
Whether or not the future nature of state warfare shifts towards one of largely cyber, or a
mix of both methods, or whether or not a cyberwar causes comparable damage to kinetic wars in
the future, that is not for this thesis to suggest. However, based on the increasing prevalence and
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severity of state cyber operations, it is fair to say that state cyber operations warrant concern and
prioritization of this topic within technical fields as well as international studies. Despite the
future of state warfare, there are inherent and fundamental characteristics of cyber conflict that
render it an entirely unique challenge than previous forms of military kinetic battlefield warfare.
These qualities are evident based on state cyber operations within US bilateral relationships of
the last decade, especially those that were focused on in this thesis. Lastly, and for the most
significant contribution to the existing body of literature, not only are these inherent
characteristics of state cyber conflict affecting and co-evolving with geopolitics and state
relations, but they are directly challenging the stability and continuity of the western-led liberal
international order. As other scholars have suggested, the US will have to take various strides in
order to preserve the liberal institutions that define its hegemony; however in addition,
addressing this new challenge of state-led cyber operations and cyber approaches to warfare will
be a must.
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Appendix B: Worldwide Threat Assessment by U.S. Intelligence, 2018.
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Appendix C: The Cyber Kill Chain, Lockheed Martin.
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Appendix D: The Diamond Model of Intrusion Analysis, 2013.
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